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POSITIVISM AND THE SEPARATION OF LAW
AND ECONOMICS
Avery Wiener Katz*
INTRODUCTION

The modem field of law and economics - that is, the application
of economic analysis to legal subjects other than trade and business regulation - is now over thirty years old, but it remains controversial in
the legal academy and, to a lesser extent, in the profession at large.
Since its beginnings in the early 1960s, the economic approach has provoked substantial opposition and antagonism. The sources of this resistance, however, are a matter of dispute. Many economists and economically influenced lawyers attribute it to more traditional lawyers' .
reluctance to learn a new and unfamiliar set of concepts and techniques.
Critics of the economic approach offer a variety of other explanations.
Some are skeptical of the utility of abstract theoretical modeling in the
social sciences, 1 others object to economics' central behavioral assumption of rational choice,2 still others criticize economics' supposed libertarian politics and ideological allegiance to laissez-faire.3 The explanation that has attracted the most attention by far is economics'
commitment to the efficiency criterion: proponents of the economic approach tend to argue that more traditional lawyers have not paid enough
attention to efficiency, and its detractors tend to argue that economics

* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. B.A. 1980, University of
Michigan; A.M. 1983, J.D. 1985, Ph.D. 1986, Harvard. - Ed. I am grateful to numerous colleagues, students, and teachers for conversations that helped me work out my
ideas on this subject; to Rick Beckner, Jules Coleman, Heidi Feldman, Christine Jolls,
Steven Medema, Dennis Patterson, Rip Verkerke, Wendy Wiener Katz, and workshop
participants at Georgetown, the University of Michigan, and George Mason University
for helpful comments on this essay; to Constantine Potamianos and Martin Saad for research assistance; and to Georgetown University Law Center and to the Cook Fund of
the University of Michigan Law School for financial research support.
1. See, e.g., Arthur Allen Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About
Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451 (1974).
2. See, e.g., Mark Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 769; Richard H.
Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory,
Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121 (1990).
3. See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or Politics?, 8
HOFSTRA L. REv. 905 (1980).
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inappropriately focuses on efficiency to the exclusion of other normative consideration.s.4
All these explanations, however, are too narrow. As with any conflict between rival disciplines, the underlying division between law and
economics is methodological and cultural. The two fields use different
rhetorics, different styles of discourse, different epistemologies, and different literary forms in developing and articulating their respective accounts of the world. Resistance to interdisciplinary exchange between
lawyers and economists comes partly from the fact that neither group
wishes to give up its own culture in favor of the other's.5 It also comes,
however, from the two sides' failure to understand each other's cultural
practices in full context.
My thesis is that one of the foremost cultural differences between
law and economics is economists' methodological commitment to positivism - the idea that it makes sense to distinguish between things as
they are and things as they should be, between fact and value, between
is and ought. While this distinction has a long tradition in Western
thought, it has come under substantial attack in the twentieth century
and today is regarded as highly controversial in the field of philosophy
in which it originated and in most social sciences other than economics.
Economists, however, are for the most part untouched by this controversy; they continue implicitly to adhere to positivism within their professional circles and, when the issue is raised explicitly, typically assert
it to be a metaphysical truth. Within economic culture, it is an article of
faith that fact and value can be distinguished and that one can talk
about the former without talking about the latter.
Accordingly, when their policy recommendations are challenged
on normative grounds - typically because the recommendations are
based in substantial part on the goal of Pareto efficiency, and the challenger disputes the merit of this goal - economists have tended to defend their arguments by appealing to the positivist distinction. Even if
the efficiency norm is controversial, this standard defense goes, economic analysis is still valid as a descriptive theory of human behavior.
Hence, it will still help to predict what will happen if the policies under
consideration are adopted. For example, in the area of federal agricultural policy, economists will point out that if government price supports
for individual crops are cut, then prices will fall, output will rise, farmers will become poorer, and consumers and taxpayers will become
4. See, e.g., Symposium on Efficiency as a Legal Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 485
(1980); A Response to the Efficiency Symposium, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 811 (1980).
5. See James Boyd White, Economics and Law: Two Cultures in Tension, 54 TENN.
L. REV. 161 (1987).
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wealthier. Furthermore, the net outcome will be a potential Pareto improvement, in th~t the total dollar amounts gained by consumers and
taxpayers will exceed the dollar amount lost by farmers. All this is just
a matter of objective fact, economists will say, and can be corroborated
by referring to the empirical world. Whether or not the net efficiency
gain from cutting farm supports is worth the distributional consequences is an entirely independent question, the answer to which depends on one's normative commitments. There is, after all, often a
trade-off between efficiency and fair distribution, and economists do not
necessarily expect everyone to like efficiency as much as they do. The
proper resolution of this trade-off will have to depend on political,
moral, and pragmatic arguments, in which some economists will wish
to engage and some will not. 6 The underlying descriptive analysis, however, is an indispensable starting point for anyone who wishes to make
an informed normative choice, for it is only through such analyses that
we can discover the extent of the trade-off and begin to design policies
that best address it. Indeed, as Milton Friedman argued in his classic essay on the subject, The Methodology of Positive Economics, a clear
positive understanding of the situation often will help resolve normative
disagreement.7
To a substantial extent, the critics of law and economics have been
unmoved by this defense, and it is worth asking why. The beginning of
an answer comes from recognizing that while positivism is uncontroversial in economic culture, it is highly controversial in legal culture - especially in late twentieth-century American legal culture. Furthermore,
economists are not absolutely consistent in their methodological practices. In their official and quasi-official pronouncements, most economists maintain that proper scientific method requires a clear separation
between positive and normative discourse and commonly defend this
claim by citing Friedman's essay.8 This is especially true for those econ6. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency
Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980). For a classic defense of economic efficiency as a criterion for public policy, see Thomas C. Schelling,
Economic Reasoning and the Ethics of Policy, PuB. INTEREST, Spring 1981, at 37. For a
pragmatic argument limited to the field of law and economics, see Louis Kaplow &
Steven Shaven, Why the Legal System ls Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994).
7. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in EsSAYS IN
POSITIVE EcONOMICS 3 (1953).
8. Typical invocations of Friedman's methodological orthodoxy in the law and economics literature include Fred S. McChesney, Positive Economics and All That, 61
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 272 (1992) (reviewing FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE EcONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991)); Paul H. Rubin, Some
Notes on Methodology in Law and Economics, 7 REs. L. & EcoN. 29 (1985). See also
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omists trained in the Chicago school, who have been most influential in
promoting the economic approach to law. In practice, however, both
Chicago and non-Chicago economists often adopt a less stringent approach, mixing positive with normative discourse as their particular purposes require. 9
This inconsistency between official methodology and actual practice remains workable within the discipline of economics. Indeed, there
are good pragmatic reasons for economists to talk this way to each
other, as I will explain; it allows them to do their work while communicating with reasonable clarity. When imported into the economic analysis of law, however, this manner of discourse can be confusing and
offputting to noneconomists, as the reasons why positivism makes sense
for economists in their own professional culture do not necessarily carry
over into the legal setting. These reasons usually go unexplained, moreover, because for most economists they are background assumptions,
tacitly understood rather than explicitly articulated. Instead, methodological arguments in law and economics are usually presented as selfevident metaphysical assertions, rather than accounts of a pragmatic
stance. As a result, many lawyers regard economists as methodologically milve at best, and incoherent at worst. 10 But what is really going
on is a clash of cultures, as economists' accustomed ways of talking un-

Richard A. Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TExAs L. REV. 757, 768 (1975)
("It is a general, and in my opinion deplorable, characteristic of legal scholarship that
normative analysis vastly preponderates over positive. Academic lawyers are in general
happier preaching reform of the legal system than trying to understand how it operates.
This is true of many lawyers having a bent for economics ••• and of those economists
who view the legal system from the dizzy heights of theoretical welfare economics. The
result of the preference for normative analysis is that our knowledge of the legal system
is remarkably meager, incomplete, and unsystematic - a situation which, ironically,
~akes it very difficult to propose sound reforms of the system.").
9. As Friedman himself allowed:
Confusion between positive and normative economics is to some extent inevitable. The subject matter of economics is regarded by almost everyone as vitally important to himself and within the range of his own experience and competence; it is the source of continuous and extensive controversy and the occasion
for frequent legislation.... Laymen and experts alike are inevitably tempted to
shape positive conclusions to fit strongly held normative preconceptions and to
reject positive conclusions if their normative implications - or what are said to
be their normative implications - are unpalatable.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 3-4.
10. See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 86-150 (1987);
J.M. Balkin, Too Good To Be True: The Positive Economic Theory of Law, 87 COLUM.
L. REV. 1447 (1987) (reviewing WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
EcONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987)); Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669 (1979).
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wittingly feed into the long-standing controversies over positivism in
law.
This culture clash stands in the way of open interdisciplinary exchange between economics and law. In order for scholars and professionals to understand the ideas of another discipline, they must understand the implicit context of these ideas, as well as their explicit text. In
this regard, the exponents of the economic approach to law have been
less successful in translating text than context. Most lawyers do not
read the interdisciplinary literature in law and economics, after all, let
alone the economic literature. They have little reason to know much
about economic methodology, and they certainly lack any basis to appreciate its practical meaning for economists. As a result, the critics and
proponents of economic analysis of law often just talk past each other,
and few lawyers or economists have the ability to navigate through the
fog.
The goal of this essay is to explain this problem and to translate
the meaning of positivism between legal and economic cultures, in order to show economists and lawyers why much of the debate about the
jurisprudential merits of law and economics misses the mark. My thesis
is that it is positivism, and the way economic culture treats the positivenormative distinction, that is responsible for much of the gulf between
law and economics - but that it is also positivism that makes economics so appealing to so many lawyers and legal scholars. For a positivist
approach can be useful to lawyers as an instrument for pursuing many
of their own professional ends.
More specifically, my view is that one's opinion on the worth of
economic analysis to lawyers ultimately comes down to which side one
takes on the merits of positivism in law. This accounts for this essay's
title, which is intended to invoke and pay homage to H.L.A. Hart's classic essay, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals. 11 Hart's essay was part of a widely celebrated exchange in the 1958 volume of the
Harvard Law Review, in which he defended his jurisprudential account
of legal positivism against the criticisms of Lon Fuller, who argued that
Hart's positivism failed to do justice to, and indeed threatened to undercut, the law's implicit moral underpinnings - what Fuller called the internal morality of law. 12 I want to argue that in this debate, law and economics effectively comes down on Hart's side, and its critics come
down on the side of Fuller.
11. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 593 (1958).
12. See Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A Reply to Professor
Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958).
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Let me be more precise about this argument, for it is a cultural
rather than a philosophical one. In the fields of law, economics, and
philosophy, the term "positivism" can refer to several distinct intellectual positions. One of these positions is classic legal positivism, which
is a metaphysical theory about the concept of law. Traditional legal positivism maintains that what counts as law is a matter of social fact, and
that law is conceptually separate from morality. The jurisprudential
literature on legal positivism concerns itself with issues such as the particular social facts that give rise to law - for instance, does it arise out
of the commands of the sovereign, out of some generally acknowledged
rule of recognition, or elsewhere - and the extent to which the law can
incorporate moral principles while retaining its independent authority
and identity. 13 The Hart-Fuller debate is partly, though not entirely,
about legal positivism in this narrow sense. A second position, sometimes called logical positivism, combines an ontological claim about
language with an epistemological claim about the valid sources of
human knowledge. Logical positivism maintains that linguistic statements are not meaningful unless they are either true a priori (that is, reducible to formal tautologies) or verifiable through empirical experience. Modem economic methodology, and Friedman's account of it in
particular, is often said to be derived from the tenets of logical positivism.14 A third, more limited position, overlapping with logical positivism and traceable ultimately to Hume, claims that is-statements simply
belong to a different metaphysical category than ought-statements, so
that the validity of one kind of statement is logically separate from the
validity of the other. This last position is sometimes taken to imply
moral subjectivism, and in my experience, it most closely reflects the
informal meaning of positivism in everyday intellectual discourse in economics and in law. 1s
13. See generally Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Legal Positivism, in A
COMPANION TO THE PHiLoSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY (D.M. Patterson ed., forthcoming 1996).
14. In addition, a distinctive aspect of Friedman's methodology is his reliance on
falsificationism: the philosophical claim, set forth most prominently by Karl Popper,
that the only legitimate way to test a scientific theory is to try to disprove it through
empirical observations. On this view, if a particular theory withstands repeated attempts
at disproof, it has been verified; it is this argument that leads Friedman to his controversial conclusion that the realism of a theory's assumptions is irrelevant to its usefulness.
See MARK BLAUG, THE METHODOLOGY OF EcONOMICS, OR How EcONOMISTS EXPLAIN
83-111 (2d ed. 1992).
15. See, e.g., Leff, supra note 1, at 454-55 ("I will put the current situation as
sharply and nastily as possible: there is today no way of 'proving' that napalming babies is bad except by asserting it (in a louder and louder voice), or by defining it as so,
early in one's game, and then later slipping it through, in a whisper, as a conclusion.
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From a purely theoretical viewpoint, these various claims are conceptually distinct, and a person consistently might accept one while rejecting the others. From the cultural viewpoint, however, it is reasonable to group them together for purposes of discussion, for all interact in
a common cultural matrix, in which rhetoric, ideology, professional
identity, and scholarly priorities are jointly shaped and determined. The
questions dividing lawyers and economists are ultimately not metaphysical but pragmatic. Their answers depend on the methodological stance
that one chooses in order to pursue one's personal, professional, and
moral ends.
Obviously, one cannot prove what "really" lies behind the resistance to law and economics, let alone that a single explanation will do.
Instead, I intend in this essay to offer a new interpretation of the debate.
Why do I think that differences over positivism are important? Primarily because mutual failures of understanding are usually the chief cause
of miscommunication, and because the connections between legal and
economic positivism are not widely understood by either economists or
lawyers. Most economists and lawyers already understand that efficiency might be thought controversial, and are careful to disclose the
extent to which they rely on it as a value; when they do rely on it, they
often defend it explicitly. Similarly, most economists understand that
lawyers may question the assumption of individual rationality; one even
sees occasional debates over this assumption within the economics profession. Most economists, however, schooled as they are in Friedman's
methodological catechism, do not understand that distinguishing fact
from value might itself be thought controversial. Lawyers, in contrast,
often do. This difference helps explain why resistance to the economic
approach to law comes from a spectrum diverse enough to include adherents to critical legal studies, neorepublicans, communitarians, liberals such as Ronald Dworkin, humanists such as James Boyd White, and
contemporary critics of the legal profession such as Anthony Kronman
and Mary Ann Glendon, who urge a revival of traditional professional
and elite values. These writers may disagree substantially among themselves, but all of them reject narrow instrumental reasoning; and all
share a desire to articulate and defend a moral vision of the law.
I am not the first in the literature on law and economics to highlight the significance of positivism for the relationship between the two
disciplines. Herbert Hovenkamp also has recognized that lawyers and
economists look at positivism differently and that this has consequence

Now this is a fact of modem intellectual life so well and painfully known as to be one
of the few which is simultaneously horrifying and banal.").
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for their interactions. 16 Hovenkamp focuses, however, on the differences
between economic and legal positivism rather than on their similarities,
and in my view mischaracterizes those differences. He argues that positivism in economics and positivism in law are essentially different ideas
that reflect essentially different professional concerns - in his view,
prediction in economics and explanation in law. Furthermore, he conflates the issue of positivism with the debate over economic efficiency.
Economic positivism, in Hovenkamp's view, ultimately and mistakenly
comes down to a commitment to efficiency as an exclusive normative
objective, and misunderstanding comes when economists, and lawyers
who are fellow travelers, unthinkingly apply this commitment to law.
His conclusion, accordingly, is that legal decisionmakers should feel
free to reject efficiency and to use economic analysis in the service of a
broader set of normative concerns - for example, classical utilitarianism or Rawlsian liberalism.
My thesis is related to Hovenkamp's in one respect: I agree that
economists and lawyers get into trouble applying ordinary economic
methodology to law without understanding its contextual presuppositions. But in my view, the difficulty goes deeper than the efficiency
norm. It is not just that lawyers and economists have different normative commitments. It is rather that they have different ideas of what it
means to have a normative commitment, for the objections to law and
economics go to the merits of trying to separate fact from value at all.
Introducing additional or competing norms such as utilitarianism or
Rawlsian liberalism does not address this more fundamental question.
Ultimately, legal positivism and economic positivism are motivated by similar concerns -- the need to separate issues that are a matter
of professional expertise from issues that are not. This is a pragmatic
problem, not a metaphysical or epistemological one; it is faced by all
professions as they seek to define their mission. The way that economists divide up the world into these two categories, however, is not
necessarily suitable for lawyers. It might well be suitable in many circumstances, but that conclusion depends on the task at hand and
whether economists or lawyers fairly can claim the expertise to perform
it. I do not think the answer turns on the difference between explanation
and prediction, however, as Hovenkamp suggests. Lawyers are often interested in prediction - for example, when they consider new legal arrangements - and economists are often interested in explanation.
Whether one is interested in predicting the future or in explaining the
16. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Positivism in Law & Economics, 78 CAL. L. REV. 815
(1990).
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past and present, however, similar pragmatic questions arise. Is it useful
to suspend judgment on normative issues to get a clearer view of descriptive ones? Is it useful to get one's descriptive account of the world
straight before engaging in normative argument? Will such a separation
serve consequentialist goals, such as efficiency, utility, or distributive
justice? Will it serve noninstrumental virtues, such as honesty and
sincerity? The economic analysis of law, and economic culture in general, says yes, but this answer is not obvious. For economists to make
the case for positivism to lawyers, they must defend explicitly its pragmatic merits.
I. WHY (MOST) ECONOMISTS ARE POSITMSTS

The distinction between positive economics and normative economics is so entrenched in modern economic culture that virtually every
introductory text in the field emphasizes the distinction in its opening
chapters. Lipsey, Steiner, Purvis, and Courant's explanation is
characteristic:
The success of modem science rests partly on the ability of scientists to separate their views on what does happen from their views on
what they would like to happen. ...
. . . Distinguishing what is true from what we would like to be true
depends on recognizing the difference between positive and nonnative
statements.
• . . Disagreements over positive statements are appropriately handled by an appeal to the facts.
. . . Disagreements over normative statements cannot be handled
merely by an appeal to facts . ...
. . . It can only obscure the truth, however, if we let our views on
what we would like to be bias our investigations of what actually is. It is
for this reason that the separation of positive from nonnative statements
is one of the foundation stones of science and that scientific inquiry, as it
is normally understood, is usually confined to positive questions. 17

Similarly, Paul Samuelson writes:
For the most part in science, scholars discuss what is and what will be
under this or that situation. The task of positive description is kept as
free as is humanly possible from the taint of wishful thinking and ethical
concern about what ought to be. Why? Because scientists are coldblooded robots? No. This is so because experience shows that a more ac-

17. RICHARD G.
original).

LIPSEY ET AL., EcONOMICS

14, 16 (9th ed. 1990) (emphasis in
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curate job of positive description will be achieved if one tries to be
objective. 18

As these quotations illustrate, positive economics denotes the side of
the' discipline that, modeling itself after the natural sciences, focuses on
describing and explaining the external world. Positive economics seeks
to explain why economic actors behave as they do and to predict how
they will act in the future. For individual behavior, positive economics
essentially comes down to the model of constrained maximization utility maximization in the theory of consumer choice, and profit maximization in the neoclassical theory of the firm. For the behavior of social groups, it comes down to models of equilibrium among maximizing

18. PAUL A SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 590-91 (11th ed. 1980) (emphasis in original); see also WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & ALAN s. BLINDER, EcONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICY 15 (4th ed. 1988) ("Finally, many disputes among economists are not scientific
disputes at all. . . . While economists can contribute the best theoretical and factual
knowledge there is on a particular issue, the final decision on policy questions often
rests either on information that is not currently available or on tastes and ethical opinions about which people differ (the things we call 'value judgments'), or on both.");
STANLEY FISCHER ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO MICROECONOMICS 4-7 (2d ed. 1988) (writing
in a subsection entitled "Is Economics a Science?"); LEE S. FRIEDMAN, MICROECONOMIC
POLICY ANALYSIS 11-12 (1984) (stating that positive questions depend on facts while
normative questions depend on discretionary value judgments); J.P. GOULD & C.E.
FERGUSON, MICROECONOMIC THEoRY 3 (5th ed. 1980) ("The business of an economist is
a positive, not a normative, one. That is, given a social objective, the economist can analyze the problem and suggest the most efficient means by which to attain the desired
end."); JACK HlRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEoRY AND APPLICATIONS 14 (2d ed. 1980) ("Given
the social objective aimed at (with which they might in fact personally disagree), scientific economists can use their knowledge of reality to analyze the problem and suggest
efficient means for attaining the desired end. This book will touch upon many policy issues, but always emphasizing the positive point of view."); DONALD N. MCCLOSKEY,
THE APPLIED THEoRY OF PRICE 2 (1982) ("The disagreements that remain about markets
often turn on disagreements about the moral desirability of some event, not its occurrence. Economists can agree on 'positive' economics (i.e., what is), yet disagree on
'normative' economics (i.e., what should be)."); WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC
THEoRY 11 (3d ed. 1985) ("A final feature central to most economic models is the attempt to differentiate carefully between 'positive' and 'normative' questions•••• Although this book generally will avoid philosophical investigations of such difficult issues, it does take a rather definite position by adopting a primarily positive
orientation."); ANDREW R SCHOTTER, MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH 4 (1994)
(distinguishing between positive and normative statements in economics and stating that
only the latter are "objective and verifiable"); and, of course, the master himself,
MILTON FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEoRY 7 (2d ed. 1976) ("Economics is sometimes divided
into two parts: positive economics and normative economics. The former deals with
how the economic problem is solved; the latter deals with how the economic problem
should be solved. For example, the effects of price or rent control on the distribution of
income are problems of positive economics. On the other hand, the desirability of these
effects on income distribution is a problem of normative economics. This course deals
solely with positive economics.") (emphasis in original).
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individuals. 19 Positive law and economics is no exception to this general
approach; it sees _law merely as a set of constraints within which individual citizens maximize.
The Hand formula for measuring negligence offers a familiar example of positive law and economics.20 If tortfeasors are held liable for
the damages that result when they take less than the legally mandated
standard of care, and if they are rational economic actors, then individual maximization implies that they will take precautions when and only
when the incremental value of doing so, measured by the expected reduction in accident costs - denoted in Judge Hand's formula by the algebraic quantity PL - exceeds the incremental cost of taking care denoted in his formula by B. Accordingly, if the legal standard of care
is set so that B=PL, then rational economic actors will choose to meet
the standard exactly. This will, as a consequence, minimize the expected
sum of accident costs and accident prevention costs, measured over society as a whole - putting aside the costs of administration and insurance, and the fact that victims as well as injurers can take precautions.21
Normative economics, conversely, denotes the side of the discipline that evaluates behavior and recommends policy reforms. The criteria of evaluation vary, but there is general agreement among economists on basic normative axioms. One of these might be called
subjective utilitarianism. This view holds that individuals are ordinarily
the best - and in extreme formulations, the only - judges of what is
in their own interests. Another might be called normative individualism.
This axiom posits that social welfare consists of nothing more than an
aggregation of individual interests. The relative weighting of interests in
such an aggregation may be open to discussion, depending on the importance one attaches to distributional equity, but the reducibility of the
public interest to private ones is not.
These basic principles are sometimes defended in utilitarian terms
and sometimes in libei:tarlan terms. They lead to the efficiency criterion
in one form or another, though there are arguments within economics
over which variant of the criterion is proper and over whether efficiency
should be regarded as an exclusive goal, or simply as one of several to

19. See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, THE EcONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 314 (1976).
20. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). For a
fuller account of the positive explanation in the text, see RICHARD A. POSNER, TORT
LAW: CASES AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 1-9 (1982).
21. For an analysis that takes these complications into account, see Steven Shaven,
Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980).
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be balanced against each other.22 Again, the Hand formula provides an
apt illustration. If negligence is measured according to a cost-benefit
test, then potential tortfeasors and victims will be induced to act efficiently when choosing precautions. This provides an argument for negligence as opposed to strict liability - or as opposed to no liability as well as an argument for measuring negligence by Hand's cost-benefit
formula instead of by noneconomic criteria such as tradition or
custom.23
Why is it important to bifurcate the field of study into normative
and positive analyses? Within economic culture, it generally is accepted
that one must distinguish between "is" and "ought" in order to have
any scientific inquiry at all.24 Many economists would follow the logical positivists in saying that this is required on philosophical grounds. A
majority probably would endorse the proposition that fact and value are
fundamentally incommensurable. Both these positions are even more
the conventional wisdom in law and economics.
A.

What's Wrong with Positivism in Economics

Despite positivism's strong hold on economic culture, however, the
idea that one can distinguish strictly between positive and normative
discourse in either the metaphysical or epistemological sense is today
widely rejected in the other social sciences and in philosophical circles.25 The reason is that such a strong distinction does not adequately
take account of the relationship between observation and observer. In
order for any empirical observation and description to be possible, one
first must choose both a vantage point and an object on which to focus.
This initial choice can be either an accident or an act of will, but it is
not itself the product of observation or description. Later descriptions
can feed back and lead to an adjustment of one's vantage point or a
change in focus, but the feedback does not eliminate the influence of
the original choice. The resulting adjustment process, furthermore, may
make it difficult if not impossible to consider alternative viewpoints.
22. Economists who identify with the Chicago school tend to endorse efficiency as
an exclusive goal, and those who do not tend to endorse efficiency in combination with
other goals, most commonly distributional equity. Economists who emphasize liberty
over utility tend to favor the criterion of Pareto superiority, which requires that those
who gain from efficient behavior compensate the losers; economists who emphasize
utility over liberty tend to favor the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, which holds it sufficient
that the gainers gain more than the losers lose.
23. See POSNER, supra note 20.
24. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 17-18.
25. See generally ROGER TRIGG, UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL SCIENCE: A PHll.oSOPHICAL
INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 21-40 (1985).

June 1996]

Positivism

2241

On this account, one's mora1 vision of the world necessarily will
shape the categopes one chooses to describe it and in tum will be
shaped by those descriptive categories. This interplay between description and evaluation is illustrated by the way we use the word "norm"
in ordinary language. "Norm" can be used in the descriptive sense, to
refer to what is common or average, but it also has evaluative overtones, referring to what is proper. Because of these dual meanings, and
because we have moral views about such things as conformity and diversity, it is hard to prevent one sense of the word from coloring our
use of it in the other sense.
It is easy to find examples of this phenomenon in economic discourse. For instance, neoclassical economics explains social behavior as
an equilibrium among maximizing individuals. Why focus on individuals as the fundamental descriptive 'units, instead of groups or classes, as
orthodox Marxist economics does? One has to start somewhere, -of
course; atomistic explanations are powerful and tractable, but they are
not wholly insulated from normative influence. Methodological reductionism is a model, not a metaphysical truth, and, like all models, aesthetic and pragmatic considerations influence the decision to use it. One
such consideration, an important one, is consistency; another is simplicity. If one is committed to normative individualism, as most economists
are, and thinks that individual decisions are of basic normative significance while group decisions are not, as most economists do, then it will
seem both consistent and simpler to focus on individual decisions for
descriptive purposes. Conversely, if one spends the bulk of one's time
describing and investigating the macroscopic consequences of individual maximization, as most economists do in their daily professional
lives, one is likelier to come to feel that individual choices should be
given normative weight. To the extent there is such an interplay between modeling and aesthetics, economists do not escape taking a position on values by confining their attention to positive description.
This epistemic objection to positivism is a general one, and could
be made about any discipline. The culture of economics, however, conflates normative and positive in a number of special ways. Foremost
among these is that economics, like other social sciences, studies a set
of problems about which people have intense ethical and political feelings. There was a time when this was true of the natural sciences too.
People cared intensely and considered it of deep moral significance
whether the sun revolved around the earth or the other way around. The
normative overtones of natural science descriptions have subsided considerably, though not entirely - as continued debates over "creation
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science" illustrate. The nonnative overtones of economic descriptions,
in contrast, remain vital.
Second, and related, economics descends historically from political
economy, which began as a branch of moral philosophy, and employs a
language and rhetoric th;:tt in part were developed for purposes of moral
reasoning. It is not surprising, then, that many technical economic tenns
have nonnative connotations in ordinary language. Among such
value-laden tenns are "equilibrium," "perfect competition," "utility,"
and "efficiency." "Equilibrium," to take just one nonobvious example,
has a technical meaning in economic theory, one drawn from the physical sciences; it means a state of affairs that tends to persist or to reinforce itself. Equilibria thus can be inefficient as well as efficient, as all
welfare economists know. In ordinary English usage, however, the word
"equilibrium" has come to connote a natural and balanced state of
rest. 26 It is not usual to use it to describe getting stuck in a rut or being
sucked into a whirlpool, even though those thmgs are equilibria in the
technical sense. For this reason, students of economics - and teachers
as well - are more likely to understand and remember the arguments
that conclude that equilibria are efficient than the ones that identify
when they are not. I can attest from personal experience as a teacher of
economics, in fact, that a fraction of every class will regularly have difficulty even accepting that it is possible for an equilibrium to be inefficient. For such tenns, their intuitive appeal in technical discourse draws
parasitically on their ordinary language meaning.
Third, economists are methodologically committed to abstraction
in theoretical modeling. Mathematical modeling has served the discipline well by allowing both theoretical and empirical arguments to be
put forward with greater clarity, to be checked for error more reliably,
and to be analogized and generalized more easily. In practice, however,
purely abstract models are difficult to learn and remember, even for
those with substantial experience in using them. As a result, it is often
necessary to simplify and to "motivate" such models with particular illustrative examples, presented in the fonn of a narrative. Accordingly,
in economic seminars, lectures, and articles, it is customary for conversations to proceed in concert on two levels - a fonnal and often mathematical level, focusing on the details of the abstract model, and an infonnal and intuitive level, focusing on examples, or on what economists
colloquially refer to as the "story. " 27 The particular examples and the

26. Perhaps, ironically enough, this is because of the nonnative overtones of its
historical use in the natural sciences over the last two centuries.
27. See generally DONALD N. MCCLOSKEY, THE RHETORIC OF EcONOMICS (1985).
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rhetorical aspects of the narrative, being chosen with the goal of persuasion, necessarily .will reflect the individual preferences and normative
commitments of both the modeler and the audience. This is especially
the case when the examples used are drawn from introspection.28
The model of utility maximization presents a good example of this
phenomenon. Most mathematically trained economists view utility maximization as an abstraction and doubt that utility is measbrable by any
direct observation. Indeed, in modem treatments of economic theory,
the concept of utility typically is represented in the form of a mathematical function with certain formal topological properties like continuity,
convexity, and transitivity.29 This terminology poses no problem for
mathematical economists who have good intuitions regarding the implications of topological mappings. For those without the special background necessary to appreciate the aesthetics of this way of looking at
the matter, however - and this includes not just noneconomists but
most applied economists as well - some additional explanation is
needed. Various explanations are available for this purpose, depending
on the sophistication of the audience and the specific focus of the
model. In the field of law and economics, for instance, it is common to
simplify things by equating utility with money; most audiences will find
this idea intuitive and no theoretical generality is lost so long as considerations of risk allocation are not at issue. This simplification, however,
sends an obvious, though implicit, normative message: it is normal and hence appropriate - for people to pursue monetary wealth to the
exclusion of other goals. This is not the only story that can be told
about individual consumer behavior, of course. An alternative though
more complicated account would incorporate what introductory textbooks call diminishing marginal utility and what mathematical economists call convexity. This latter narrative will invoke images of satiation
and boredom, and will send a rather different normative message: that
more money does not always buy more happiness.
Fourth, economics' central normative concept - efficiency - is a
peculiar blend of the positive and the normative. Indeed, there is substantial inconsistency in the literature in this regard, with some writers
classifying efficiency analysis as part of positive economics and others

28. Cf. Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971) (arguing that the apparent precision of mathematical models misleads those who use them into believing that all relevant considerations have been included).
29. See, e.g., E. MALINVAUD, LECTURES ON MICROECONOMIC THEoRY 12-42 (A.
Silvey trans., North-Holland Publishing Co. 1972) (1969); HAL R VARIAN,
MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 111-70 (2d ed. 1984).
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categorizing it as nonnative economics.30 This inconsistency has generated some confusion, but it is fair to say that both usages have some basis. In one sense, to say that a policy or rule is efficient is to make a
complex descriptive statement. It means that either (a) some people
gain from it in their O\\'.n sights and no one loses from it in their own
sights, or (b) some people gain from it, some people lose, and that the
cumulated gains of the winners, measured by the amount of money one
could take away from them and leave their situation unimproved on
balance, exceeds the cumulated losses of the losers, measured by the
amount of money one would have to give to them in order to compensate them for the loss. Because all of the elements of these compound
statements are descriptive, the compound statement about efficiency is
descriptive.
This is, I take it, the position of the economists who regard efficiency as a positive issue. Efficiency seems a descriptive concept to
these economists because they have a well-defined algorithm for checking its presence that is elaborate enough to be interesting as a basis for
professional discussion. Compare, for example, the algorithm for checking whether a mathematical proof is valid - it is also well-defined, but
still complicated and uncertain enough in its application for mathematicians to have interesting arguments over it.
In full context, however, while statements about efficiency imply
such compound descriptive statements, they are not equivalent to them.
This is because in economic discourse the statement "X is efficient" is
often - though not always - made in an interpretative context in
which it is mutually understood that the speaker and listeners subscribe
to efficiency as a nonnative goal and that this goal is relevant to the
subject being discussed. In such a context, to say something is efficient
also implies the statement that it ought to be done, absent some countervailing reason. By way of comparison, there are various accounts of
distributional equity that can be checked by similarly well-defined and
interesting algorithms - for instance, John Rawls's maximin rule. 31 But
this hardly makes Rawls's theory a positive one under ordinary interpretive circumstances, nor does it make discussions of distributional equity
into positive discourse.

30. See, e.g., GOULD & FERGUSON, supra note 18 (presenting efficiency as part of
positive economics); NICHOLSON, supra note 18 (presenting efficiency as part of normative economics). For discussions of this inconsistency, see BLAUG, supra note 14, at
112-34; Hovenkamp, supra note 16, at 822-26.
31. See John Rawls, Some Reasons for the Maximin Criterion, 64 AM. EcON. RBV.
141 (1974).
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Another way of saying this is that efficiency is what some philosophers call a "thi~k" or "blend" concept. It denotes something that is
good, but it is a specific sort of good, not an all-purpose one. This
makes it appear simultaneously descriptive, because of the specificity,
and evaluative, because of the denotation of goodness.32 Because of the
background interpretive context of most economic discussions, therefore, I do not think that the concept of efficiency can be described fairly
as a purely positive one in ordinary discourse. 33
Those who claim that efficiency is part of positive economics,
however, are right in one respect: as with any blend concept, the evaluative aspects of efficiency do depend on description. The manner in
which efficiency is regarded as good is contingent, not absolute; procedural, not substantive. What is efficient depends on the empirical configuration of individual tastes and preferences, and changes as those
preferences change. Another way of saying this is that efficiency as a
normative concept is based on means and not ends. We speak of
processes being efficient: an efficient path from point A to point B, an
efficient diet for losing weight, or an efficient management structure. It
would not be consistent with the usual meaning of the word, however,
for us to describe an end goal as efficient. We could not say whether it
is efficient to go to point B in the first place, except as a means to get
somewhere else such as point C; and we could not say whether it is efficient to lose weight, except as a means to improve one's health,
budget, or social life.
Since efficiency only requires us to evaluate means, it allows us to
engage in - or to assist - normative analysis without subscribing to
the ends we pursue or even committing to an opinion of whether those
ends are good ones. In introducing economics to law students, for instance, I use the hypothetical example of a pious monk whose sole interest lies in increasing the glory of God. This can be done in various
32. For an explanation of this concept, with an emphasis on legal applications, see
Heidi Li Feldman, Objectivity in Legal Judgment, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1187 (1994).
Feldman, who maintains that most legal categories depend on such blend concepts, offers several examples, including "rude" (carrying a negative evaluation, though not in
all circumstances), "loyal" (carrying a positive evaluation, though not in all circumstances), and "negligent" (carrying a negative evaluation in all the contexts that lawyers care about).
33. To be fair, those economists who describe efficiency analysis as positive economics are not wrong in principle. Instead, they are simply insensitive to interpretation
and to culture, and have failed to realize that the context they are thinking of is not the
usual one. It is possible to discuss efficiency from an external perspective; some critics
of law and economics do it regularly. If economists wish to talk about efficiency in a
nonstandard way, they may be able to, but will have to extricate themselves from an
evaluative context and make clear that they are engaging in specialized discourse.
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ways, including prayer, meditation, and good works, but since there are
only so many hours in the day, and since the monk must spend a certain
amount of time eating and sleeping in order to remain alive, it is necessary to make choices about how much time to spend doing what. The
monk's problem of allqcating scarce time, I suggest to my students,
may not be formally different from the problem faced by a selfish yuppie who must allocate his lavish but finite monetary income among various material goods. 34 Conversely, efficiency easily can be put in the
service of affirmatively evil ends. It would not stretch the usual meaning of the word efficiency at all to describe Eichmann's managerial arrangements for the concentration camps under his supervision as an efficient approach to the Nazi program of genocide. In this usual sense,
efficiency can appear to be value-free, because whether it is desirable
depends upon whether the ends it serves are desirable.
For all these reasons, most economists mix normative and positive
discourse with some regularity. The official methodology is probably
impossible to follow strictly as a psychological matter, even if it were
epistemologically coherent. As a result, normative rhetoric in economics
is much more important and frequent than official methodology would
hold it to be.

B. What's Right with Positivism in Economics
Does all this mean that the introductory textbooks are wrong in
trying to distinguish positive economic issues from normative ones, or
that economists' ordinary discourse is incoherent? It does not, because
within economics, the positive-normative distinction is pragmatically
useful. It helps economists to separate out professional arguments,
which get classified as positive, from extraprofessional arguments,
which get classified as normative. The distinction helps to guide the direction of professional efforts and to promote the development of expertise within the discipline. Given the common purposes and culture of
the economics community, this can be done with reasonable consistency
- just as the legal community manages largely to agree on the practical boundaries of formal legal categories such as consideration and duress despite the overlap among and tension between those categories at
a theoretical level.

34. On the other hand, the example is an intentionally subversive one, for it encourages students to consider, specifically, whether this is really what we mean by
piety, and generally, whether there are important values that cannot be captured fairly
by the deliberate pursuit of an end goal. In this regard, see infra Part IY.
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The reason why it is useful to separate out professional from extraprofessional di~course is that there are and always have been substantial normative disagreements among economists over the issues of redistribution, desert, and the relative importance of liberty and economic
welfare. Like any other social grouping, economists display a range of
opinion on these issues; between the Chicago and non-Chicago camps
the range is particularly wide. The range of opinions was wider still
when Friedman wrote his classic essay, for at that time substantial numbers of economists were socialists and the idea of running a centrally
planned economy on market principles - what is sometimes called
Lerner-Lange socialism - was taken quite seriously in the economic
mainstream.35
As an empirical matter, these differences in economists' views on
redistribution are imperfectly correlated with their views on other matters such as whether most markets are workably competitive, whether
centralized or decentralized institutions are relatively more efficacious ·
in allocating resources, or whether equilibrium or disequilibrium is the
more useful concept when describing the behavior of the
macroeconomy. Quite often economists can agree on these issues even
when they disagree on the merits of redistribution; certainly Friedman
believed this to be the case.36
As a rule, however, contemporary economists for the most part do
not think they have anything particularly useful to say qua economists
on the merits of redistribution. They do think, however, that they have
useful things to say about efficiency. Moreover, economists may be able
to agree on predictions regarding the efficiency of a proposed policy
even when they do not agree on predictions regarding its distributional
incidence. The two effects can be measured with different theoretical
tools: efficiency calculations often can be obtained by an arbitrage or a
marginalist argument while distributional calculations cannot. Under
some circumstances, formalized in what economists call the second theorem of welfare economics, efficiency and distributional issues can
even be segregated without any loss of theoretical generality.37
35. See OSKAR LANGE & FRED M. TAYLOR, ON THE EcONOMIC THEoRY OF SOCIALISM (Benjamin E. Lippincott ed., McGraw-Hill Book Co. 1964) (1938); ABBA P.
LERNER, THE EcONOMICS OF CONfROL: PRINCIPLES OF WELFARE ECONOMICS (1944); Tibor
Scitovsky, Lerner's Contribution to Economics, 22 J. EcoN. LITERATURE 1547 (1984).
36. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 5-6; sources cited supra notes 17-18; see also
J.R. Kearl et al., A Confusion of Economists?, AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.), May
1979, at 28 (presenting results of opinion surveys demonstrating that economists agree
on a variety of applied policy issues).
37. See A. Mitchell Polinsky, Economic Analysis as a Potentially Defective Product: A Buyer's Guide to Posner's Economic Analysis of Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1655,
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The desire to keep disagreement over politics and policy from disrupting analytical progress is not new, as an example drawn from the
history of economic thought will illustrate. A similar problem arose in
the nineteenth century out of the political and philosophical controversies over classical utilitµianism and its implications for the distribution
of wealth. While nineteenth-century utilitarians such as Bentham and
Edgeworth argued that one reasonably could compare utility across different individuals, the political consequences of doing so were potentially radical. Diminishing marginal utility implied that the greatest
good for the greatest number might be achieved best by a leveling of
incomes, since a dollar taken from an aristocrat would cost less in utility terms than the same dollar would provide to a common laborer.38
Modern utility theory, as developed by Pareto in the early decades of
this century, avoids such controversies by refusing to measure utility
except in subjective terms. On the modern view, willingness to pay is a
simple observable fact; it can be made empirically measurable and
hence objective. Utility is a subjective value, in contrast, and is not regarded as empirically measurable; so there is no interpersonally valid
way to distinguish between the utilities of the aristocrat and the laborer
- or, indeed, between those of Eichmann and the pious monk. This
historical example shows, accordingly, how positivism has long helped
to establish and maintain economics as a separate discipline, by keeping
political controversies outside the field of professional discourse rather
than inside.39
Furthermore, the role of positivism in professional economic discourse is not strictly defensive, as it also helps keep economists focused
on their discipline's fundamental contributions and insights. The factvalue distinction has figured prominently in economic culture for two
centuries in large part because it resonates with the central concept of
scarcity. Economics has been derided as the "dismal science," after all,
ever since Thomas Malthus argued that mass famine was an inevitable
1667-69 (1974); see also Kenneth Arrow, The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market Versus Nonmarket A/location, in PuBuc EXPENDITURES AND POLICY ANALYSIS 59 (Robert H. Haveman & Julius Margolis eds., 2d ed.
1977).
38. See Ross Harrison, Jeremy Bentham, in 1 THE NEW PAI.GRAVE: A DICTIONARY
OF EcONOMICS 226 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987); Peter Newman, Francis Ysidro
Edgeworth, in 1 THE NEW PAI.GRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF EcONOMICS, supra, at 84; cf.
A.C. Pigou, THE EcONOMICS OF WELFARE 89 (1920) ("[T]he old law of diminishing utility thus leads securely to the proposition: Any cause which increases the absolute share
of real income in the hands of the poor, provided that it does not lead to a contraction
in the size of the national dividend ... will in general, increase economic welfare.").
39. See generally Robert Cooter & Peter Rappaport, Were the Ordinalists Wrong
About Welfare Economics?, 22 J. EcON. LITERATURE 507 (1984).
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consequence of the fact that population grew exponentially while food
production could grow only at a constant linear rate. 40 Within the discipline, such a dispassionate if not dismal attitude has come to be thought
essential to arriving at a realistic account of the world - else wishes
based on our unlimited wants might prevent us from making best use of
the scarce resources we are lucky enough to have at our disposal and
lead us to disaster. Drawing a strong distinction between "is" and
"ought" helps reinforce this central lesson.
Still, economists feel as strongly about distribution and liberty as
anyone else. Considering that they spend much of their professional
time analyzing issues of public policy and institutional organization
about which most ordinary folk have intense moral feelings, it is not
surprising that they sometimes find it difficult to keep such concerns
from creeping into their professional discourse. For this reason, it is
highly useful for them to have a convention that enables them to clarify
whether their disagreements are primarily caused. by differences in their
moral opinions, or whether they reflect professional disagreement over
technical issues. Having the issue of redistribution up for grabs in ordinary professional discourse would create more heat than light.
So, to make the most of professional discourse and argument, economic culture has developed a distinctive strategy: focus primarily on
individual maximization, group equilibrium, and efficiency issues, and
defer controversial distributional issues to someone else - the legislature, perhaps, or the citizenry at large. Economists of the Chicago
school follow this strategy by confining their economic policy recommendations to what is efficient. Outside the Chicago school, the standard approach is to report the trade-off between equity and efficiency
and let the polity decide what to do. Both versions of the strategy,
though, are essentially ways of diverting controversy outside the field
of economics. Indeed, modem welfare economics implicitly suggests,
by analogizing the choice between equity and efficiency to consumer
choice among goods, that the efficiency-equity trade-off cannot be resolved objectively.41 The strategy has been highly successful as a matter
of professional harmony, if nothing else; economists are more unified in
their methodology, if not in their personal politics, than any other group
of social scientists.
40. See ROBERT L. HEILBRONER, THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS: THE LIVES, TIMES,
AND IDEAS OF THE GREAT EcONOMIC TlnNKERs 75-104 (6th ed. 1986) (titling chapter 4
"The Gloomy Presentiments of Parson Malthus and David Ricardo").
41. See ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF (1975);
A. Burk [Abram Bergson], A Reformulation of Certain Aspects of Welfare Economics,
52 QJ. EcON. 310 (1938).
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Ultimately, the positive-normative distinction separates controversies in which ec01;1omists have enough common ground to assert professional expertise from those in which they do not. As such, the distinction makes sense for the same reasons that professional roles make
sense. In a field that stresses opportunity cost and comparative advantage, there is strong pressure .to leave redistributional debates to other
persons and fora who are likely to be no worse at such debates, to conserve professional resources for problems where they will make a difference. As Robert Lucas, the leading macroeconomist of the modern
Chicago school, has remarked in a published interview:
Interviewer: Do you think that the distinction between the positive and

the nonnative side of economics is useful?
Lucas: Yeah. It's an essential distinction [pause]. We've been arguing

about that around here a lot lately. There's a feeling, and I guess I've
helped encourage it, among a lot of younger people that the politics an~
the political role that economists play ha[ve] had a very bad effect on
macroeconomics. A lot of older economists seem to me to be solely concerned with politics, as opposed to scientific matters. People are asking
the wrong questions; they are taking questions from Washington, rather
than thinking about what's puzzling them or taking more scientific points
of view. 42

Given their common purposes, the majority of economists can often
agree on which problems are worth their professional attention. This explains why economists, and lawyers who have studied economics, can
think of efficiency- as a positive issue despite its normative aspects.
What they really mean is: economists have something to say about efficiency as a matter of professional expertise.
Of course, to the extent that positivism serves the purpose of defining professional role, it should also be useful to lawyers. They have
professional expertise of their own: they can read cases and separate
holdings from dicta; they can interpret statutes; and the like. Accordingly, they should also find it useful to distinguish professional from
extraprofessional issues. Why then, should economic positivism be so
problematic for lawyers?
II.

WHY (MANY) LAWYERS AREN'T PosmVISTS

It is an understatement to say that positivism also looms large in
legal culture. In American jurisprudence in particular, it has been a cen42. ARJO Kl.AMER, CONVERSATIONS WITH EcONOMISTS 52 (1983) (emphasis omitted). This book, which presents interviews with a number of leading modem
macroeconomists, offers an excellent and rare window on the methodological culture of
professional economics.
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tral theme since Holmes articulated his famous prediction theory of
law. 43 The influe~ce of legal positivism, however, derives only in part
from the metaphysical and epistemological questions it addresses. There
is also an important sociological component. Lawyers' traditional social
role, like economists', depends upon the existence of a distinctive and
specialized form of discourse that only they know how to engage in;
this is what allows them to claim expertise and professional status. Over
the history of the legal profession, various justifications have been put
forward for this claim. At certain times in the history of the legal profession, the metaphysical existence of an objective thing called "the
law" was asserted to provide such a justification, as in accounts given
by proponents of Legal Science such as Langdell.44 At other times, it
was sufficient to argue that there were special and distinctive methods
of reasoning, as in Karl Llewellyn's later writings glorifying lawyers'
"situation sense," and in the 1950s legal process materials of Hart and
Sacks.45 Legal positivism, by separating law from morality, gives lawyers something to do that not just anyone can do.
But lawyers' views of positivism also reflect a distinctive political
concern, one that economists do not share. Law is coercive; it demands
obedience and confers authority. When human law was thought to originate in divine commands, its authority was inherent and automatic. In
an age when natural law has gone out of fashion, however, we are left
with questions about the authority of the law and our obligation to obey
it. One could defend the authority of law on purely pragmatic grounds;
even a tyrannical regime might be necessary as protection if the alternative is a Hobbesian state of nature. Our constitutional and political traditions, however, have never comfortably accepted accounts of legal authority based purely on prudence. Participants in modem legal culture
regard law as more than the commands of an arbitrary sovereign whom
it is convenient to obey; instead, they expect law to reflect principle.
Positivism is politically and ethically controversial because it suggests
to some that in some sense we might be obligated to obey unprincipled
laws.
43. See O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 461 (1897)
("The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are
what I mean by the law.").
44. See Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Pm. L. REv. 1 (1983);
M.H. Hoeflich, Law & Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz to Langdell, 30 AM. J. LEGAL HlsT. 95 (1986).
45. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN. THE COMMON LAW 'fRADmON: DECIDING APPEALS
(1960); HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey
eds., 1994).
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Given the events of this century, many have found it tempting to
judge positivism in just such terms. The regimes of Nazi Germany and
Soviet Russia, which brought both law and modem science into the service of morally odious sovereigns, magnified and dramatized the political stakes of the debate. Not incidentally, they also raised the issue of
whether lawyers and scientists could be blamed for the consequences to
which their professional efforts could lead. 46 On one commonly articulated view, positivism, by fostering an intellectual climate of moral relativism, helped lay the path for the rise of totalitarianism. Proponents of
this view have argued that relativism works to break down liberals'
moral defenses against totalitarian ideologies by depriving liberals and
democrats of any claim that their values are objectively superior. Advocates of positivism, in response, have argued that it fosters a skeptical
and questioning attitude - the best defense of freedom and of the rule
of law. This intellectual debate underlay and gave context to the subsequent jurisprudential debate between Hart and ·Fuller. Specifically, in
the 1950s - a decade overshadowed by the memories of World War II
and the beginnings of the Cold. War - totalitarianism came to be seen
in legal culture as a failing of the rule of law. In this context, the postwar trials at Nuremberg and elsewhere took on central importance for
Western lawyers, for they offered the opportunity to reconstruct the rule
of law and reassert its role as a pillar of civil society. The Hart-Fuller
exchange was motivated in substantial part by the question of whether
separating law and morality would serve or undercut this purpose.47
Hart and Fuller agreed that the discipline of law necessarily incorporated some normative values: consistency, treating like cases alike,
and fair notice - what Fuller called the internal morality of law. Where
the two differed was over the issue of whether it was better to bring
other, external, values into the system of legal norms or to leave them
outside, where they could serve as a potential source of moral criticism.
Take for example the central doctrinal question of the Nuremberg trials:
the validity of Nazi law. Should one properly regard the Nazi laws as
real laws, though grossly immoral, or as not law at all, because they
were grossly immoral? This question was not merely an academic one,
for it directly bore on the outcomes of some of the postwar trials, as the
defendants raised Nazi statutes as defenses for their actions. Both Hart
and Fuller thought that German lawyers should have used more of their
influence to prevent the abuses of the Nazi regime, but they disagreed
46. See EDWARD A PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 159-96
(1973).
47. See Fuller, supra note 12, at 632-33, 644-46, 649-61; Hart, supra note 11, at
615-21.
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on how best this could have been done. Hart argued that it would have
been better to concede that Nazi laws were valid law, and argue against
them on moral grounds. 48 On this view, Nuremberg was not a legal proceeding, but a moral one. Fuller, in contrast, took the position that the
Nazi statutes were not law at all. This latter viewpoint conferred legal
status on the Nuremberg proceedings, justifying the imposition of what
otherwise would have been ex post facto liability.49
This debate hardly turned on metaphysics alone, as many have
subsequently observed.5 From a utilitarian viewpoint, one can ask: Was
it better to punish the Nuremberg defendants using the forms of law, to
punish them without the forms of law but under the substance of morality, or not to punish them at all? Which course of action would better
instill respect for liberal and democratic values in the future? Within a
deontological framework, one can ask: Was it right to punish using legal forms, to punish without legal forms, or neither? Which would best
correct the evils that had been done in the past? These are applied questions of ethics and morality on which laymen as well as lawyers can
take different views, but for lawyers and lawyers alone, there was a
special professional dimension to this debate. What was the proper
place of professional expertise and status under such circumstances? In
essence, Hart argued that the purposes of Nuremberg were best served
by lawyers' stepping outside of their professional roles. Fuller argued,
in contrast, that they should have remained within role. The argument
was in large part, to force things into an economic metaphor, over the
best use to be made of lawyers' professional and moral capital.
Though these questions are pragmatic and moral ones, the jurisprudential debate in which Hart and Fuller engaged is nonetheless relevant
to their resolution. Whether lawyers step out of role when they talk of
morality depends on what we think this role includes. If legal argument
entails moral argument, or even if it merely includes it, then Fuller was
right; good lawyering requires attention to moral issues. If legal argument is separate from moral argument, then Hart was right; our professional capital is scarce and we must take care not to squander it.
This connection between jurisprudential theory and methodological
practice is made clear by subsequent debates between Hart and Ronald
Dworkin on the nature of law. Dworkin famously has argued that legal
reasoning is fundamentally an interpretive task, and that interpretation

°

48. See Hart, supra note 11, at 620-21.
49. See Fuller, supra note 12, at 649-55.
50. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER. THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 228-39 (1990)
(arguing that the question whether the Nuremberg judgments were lawful is
meaningless).
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necessarily entails a nonnative dimension.51 In Dworkin's view, one can
never fully understand a legal system, or indeed, engage in any act of
interpretation, from the outside; a proper account requires taking, if
only temporarily, an internal perspective. Thus, in order to say whether
a legal result makes sense, we must engage in some nonnative argument. Hart's response to this argument was that even if true, it does not
undercut positivism in any interesting way. One need not adopt the legal insiders' point of view in order to understand it, or give up description in order to interpret. There is still an essential difference between
internal and external perspectives on the law. Recognizing this difference, and taking a clear-eyed external perspective when appropriate, is
still a central part of what lawyers are supposed to do.52
The apocalyptic tone of the Hart-Fuller debate was partly a function of the specter of totalitarianism that loomed over the 1950s. Happily, such threats are less immediate today, and the heated language in
which such issues were discussed has cooled -· even though one sees
vestiges of the old rhetoric in modem arguments over multiculturalism
and so-called political correctness. Debates over positivism, formalism,
and the subjectivity of values, however, remain in our public life and
continue today within legal culture. The pragmatic issues, moreover, are
the same for us as for Hart and Fuller. If one is going to criticize legal
institutions, is it better - or from a deontological viewpoint, right - to
criticize from within the law, or from without? Is it better to argue that
the law should be reformed in the service of one's preferred nonnative
values, whether progressive, New Deal, libertarian, liberal, or conservative; or is it better to argue that a true understanding of the law already
includes one's nonnative values? Or is drawing such a dichotomy incoherent and misleading?
It is worth considering these questions in light of the central problem of twentieth-century American jurisprudence: judicial legitimacy.
Here there is room for only a thumbnail sketch, but a sketch will suffice.53 By the end of the nineteenth century, judicial legitimacy came to
be grounded in a generally accepted view of law as an autonomous dis51. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); RONALD DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
52. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 238-76 (Penelope A. Bulloch &
Joseph Raz eds., 2d ed. 1994).
53. No originality is intended here; the following story is thoroughly conventional
and has been told well many times before. See, e.g., WILLIAM Tw!NING, KARL
LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT (University of Okla. Press 1985) (1973); Leff,
supra note l; Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950's, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 561
(1988); Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline:
1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761 (1987).
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cipline, founded in substantial part on professional expertise. This view,
today commonly _denoted by the term "formalism," was in turn celebrated as "legal science" by its proponents and derided as "mechanical
jurisprudence" by its critics. In the twentieth century, however, the formalist account of law came under attack from a number of quarters, and
this critique reached its apex with Legal Realism. The essence of the
Realist critique was to attack the conception of law as autonomous.
There were various pieces of the critique, not all of which fit together:
attacks on the supposed indeterminacy of legal doctrine, studies of the
underlying social and psychological determinants of judicial decisionmaking, and the embrace of explicit instrumental reasoning based on
social consequences and guided by social science.
In large part, this critique succeeded in undermining the formal
system of legal doctrine and establishing a more openly instrumental
approach. Legal Realism became the new conventional account of law,
and remains so to this day. In the immediate postwar period, however,
the degree to which Realism had undermined traditions of judicial legitimacy was masked by the relative social consensus of the time. The optimism occasioned in public and political life by the defeat of the Ax.is
powers and the end of the Depression was paralleled in legal culture by
the rise of consensus theories of jurisprudence. Llewellyn's later Realism, for instance, found the basis for consensus in lawyers' "situation
sense" - their professional skill at detecting the underlying social customs and conventions that made legal outcomes predictable.54 Similarly,
the legal process school of Hart and Sacks found room for consensus in
procedural and institutional analysis; on this view, legal professionalism
consisted of expertise in procedural structure, and judicial power was
justified on the basis of the judiciary's special institutional competence
to engage in case-by-case analysis. 55 In this way, Realist insights were
used to rebuild a new sort of legal positivism, one more responsive to
social needs than traditional formalism had appeared to be, but still
based on the idea that there were certain questions specially suited to
lawyers' professional expertise. This approach was epitomized in public
law by Herbert Wechsler's celebrated article arguing for the establishment of neutral principles in constitutional law,56 and was epitomized in

54. See LLEWELLYN. supra note 45.
55. See HART & SACKS, supra note 45.
56. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1 (1959).
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private law by the promulgation and adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code.57
, The political experience of the succeeding generation of lawyers,
however, was fundamentally different. In the 1960s and 1970s, the new
version of positivism ceased to provide sufficient legitimacy within the
profession. The larger political and social consensus of the 1950s disintegrated as well, as part of the schisms resulting from desegregation,
the Vietnam war, the African-American and women's liberation movements, and the transformation of the world economy from growth to
relative stagnation. In this context, scholars associated with critical legal
studies and other postmodern schools of jurisprudence argued that the
consensus always had been illusory. Lawyers had perceived a consensus, the argument went, only because of their social homogeneity ·and
privileged position as an elite social class. Indeterminacy in law existed
not just at the level of rules, according to this critique, but at the deeper
level of principles.58 On this view, Wechsler's plea to find "neutral
principles" could be cast in hindsight not as Realism but as.a new kind
of formalism - a conservative attempt to paper over conflict about
fundamental values.59
Thus today, for many in the contemporary legal academy and in
the legal culture as a whole, the central pragmatic issue of positivism
remains: how to construct a normative order for law. Legal positivists,
either of the traditional or of the "legal process" school, remain influential. They continue to dominate the practicing bar and the senior generations of the legal academy. But, their view is challenged frequently
- by critical theorists, communitarians, and humanists of various
stripes, ranging from Roberto Unger to Cass Sunstein to Catharine
MacKinnon to James Boyd White. And more recently, conservative expressions of the same critique have been advanced by commentators
such as Anthony Kronman, Mary Ann Glendon, and Harry Edwards.
These latter authors argue for a revival of a traditional elite professional
culture and criticize both CLS and law and economics for their supposed nihilism.
Viewed from a more skeptical viewpoint, all these authors display
a romantic tone of one sort or another. Some are nostalgic, and some
are millenarian; some conservative and some radical. Each, however, in
57. See Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REV. 621 (1975).
58. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD.
351 (1973).
59. See Peller, supra note 53, at 606-17.
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his or her own way, is attempting to rebuild a normative structure in
law in response to its apparent breakdown. This is legal culture's version of the "culture wars" now being waged in the wider academy and
of the "values" debate going on in public life as a whole. For many
contemporary lawyers, addressing this debate is their central professional task.
III.

LAW AND ECONOMICS CONFLATED

Where, then, does law and economics fit into this picture of contemporary legal culture? One way in which it might be thought to fit in
is as a new consensus theory. Law and economics arrived at the jurisprudential door in the 1960s and 1970s just as the standard pos~ar
consensus theories came under attack. In that context, its most ambitious proponents - Richard Posner, primarily, and to a lesser extent
Guido Calabresi - put it forward as a potential successor to Legal
Realism: a theory that could promote social consensus because the policies it recommended and rationalized were potentially Pareto superior.
Law and economics could appear a plausible candidate for a new
consensus theory of law for a variety of reasons. It fit in well with the
strands of Legal Realism that emphasized reliance on administrative expertise, and in its emphasis on value creation and economic growth, it
also drew on aspects of the legal process tradition. Additionally, the
mid-to-late 1960s saw the high point of prestige for the American economic profession. The national economy had just come through the
longest sustained period of growth in modem times. Federal agencies,
led by Robert McNamara at the Defense Department, had begun to introduce systematic cost-benefit analysis as a tool for procurement. For
the first time in history, under the influence of the Kennedy administration's Council of Economic Advisers, the federal government adopted
Keynesian economic theory as the theoretical underpinning of its fiscal
policy. Reputable economists actually believed that the business cycle
had been solved and that there would be no more major recessions.
Even Richard Nixon announced himself to be a Keynesian. 60
The prestige of expertise, however, was not the only reason why
economics offered appeal as a potential consensus theory. Equally important was the way in which economic culture dealt with positivism 60. See HERBERT STEIN, THE FISCAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICA 379-84 (rev. ed.
1990) (describing economists' influence on the Kennedy tax cut); AARON WILDAVSKY,
THE POLITICS OF THE BUDGEfARY PROCESS 138-44, 193-96 (4th ed. 1984) (describing and
critiquing the use of program budgeting in the Defense Department); HUGH S. NORTON,
THE EMPLOYMENT ACT AND THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS, 1946-1976, at 216-25
(1977) (relating Nixon's ostensible conversion to Keynesian economics).
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that is, by conflating the positive and the normative. As Arthur Leff
trenchantly obsex:ved in his review of the first edition of Posner's
Economic Analysis of Law, law and economics offered a style of analysis that lawyers could see as either value-free or value-laden, depending
on how they looked at it.61 Law and economics also provided a workable and appealing normative criterion: that of Pareto efficiency. This
criterion required technical expertise to master, and thus reinforced legal traditions of professionalism. This criterion was instrumental; it
could be placed in the service of any number of social ends, depending
on what was desired. Thus, efficiency held out promise as the longawaited neutral principle.
There was just one problem: the novelty of the efficiency concept
in law interfered with its neutrality. While the arguments of law and economics might justify legislative or administrative reforms, so long as
they were new arguments they could not provide a basis for judicial -legitimacy, the fundamental problem for disillusioned post-Realists. In
Ronald Dworkin's terminology, efficiency might work as a policy for
the future but not as a principle for deciding existing disputes. 62 It is in
this context, therefore, that 'one best can appreciate Posner's thesis that
the common law was motivated primarily by the efficiency norm what has come to be called the "positive economic theory of the common law. " 63
Whatever one thinks of this thesis on the merits, to call it a purely
positive theory is incomplete at best and misleading at worst. First of
all, the theory does not much correspond to what a mainstream economist would call positive economics. The focus of analysis is overwhelmingly on efficiency. There is no attempt to measure economic
variables systematically. At most, the counting is of cases and doctrines.
Second, the focus of the theory is not on individual policies and rules,
but on the system of common law as a whole. This would not be the
typical approach within economic culture, where a typical claim in positive economics would discuss the effects of a particular government
policy or business practice. For example, a profit-maximizing business
61. See Leff, supra note 1.
62. See Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980);
Ronald Dworkin, Why Efficiency?: A Response to Professors Calabresi & Posner, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 563 (1980).
63. See RICHARD A. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 8.1, at 179 (2d ed.
1977) ("Our survey of the major common law fields suggests that the common law exhibits a deep unity that is economic in character.... The common law method is to allocate responsibilities between people engaged in interacting activities in such a way as
to maximize the joint value, or, what amounts to the same thing, minimize the joint cost
of the activities.").
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facing two distinguishable consumer groups who cannot resell to each
other might be predicted to engage in price discrimination; output
would then increase, and so on. Banning price discrimination would interfere with this behavior and lead to changes in prices and quantities,
and so on.
Typically, positive economic discourse of this sort is atomistic and
reductionist. The goal is limited - to find a good explanation of an economic phenomenon or of an aspect of that phenomenon. The premise
is that the pursuit of knowledge is a collective endeavor and a cumulation of views will lead to insight. The economic theory of the common
law, in contrast, is not atomistic; it is like traditional legal discourse,
tending to a holistic style. The goal is grand: to explain all the cases
with a unifying theory. An analogy in traditional economics might be
the study of whether capitalism as a whole is efficient. Economists have
had, and continue to have, arguments over this general claim, but these
are not understood as ordinary positive discourse within economic
culture.
Nor can the task of bringing order to legal doctrine be understood
as solely a descriptive endeavor within legal culture. Various patterns
can be found in a complex sequence of case law, or imprinted on it. Because empirical experience is roughly consistent with a variety of theoretical patterns and perfectly consistent with none, which pattern seems
most appealing will influence and be influenced by the purposes of the
viewer- as Dworldn's critique of Hart made plain.
Furthermore, the construction of doctrinal order carries normative
force for lawyers. This is because within legal culture, precedent and
pattern are blend concepts. The community attaches normative weight
to consistency and to the related values of fair notice, impartiality, and
treating like cases alike. This is especially so when the task of bringing
order is undertaken by inside members of the culture as opposed to outsiders, since insiders have a stake in the coherence of the system while
outsiders do not. To illustrate, when discussing a foreign legal system,
one might ask "does Finnish law reflect the efficiency norm" in the
same way that one might ask "does Finnish law contain a doctrine of
adverse possession." The former question is more complicated, and
would require a greater number of ad hoc empirical judgements, but as
an outsider one conceivably could ask the question without caring much
how the answer comes out. Insiders, however, care; they will view the
legal rule as something to be followed once discerned. Thus, description
by insiders will always have stronger overtones of normative argument
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than description by outsiders.64 In this regard, it is telling that the socalled positive economic theory of the common law was propounded
much more often by lawyers and lawyer-economists than by economists without legal training.
Compare our earlier discussion of how statements about efficiency
operate in economic culture. Just as in economic culture it is mutually
understood that the speakers and listeners subscribe to the normative
goal of efficiency, in legal culture it is understood that the speakers and
listeners subscribe to the normative goal of consistency. Just as within
economic culture to say something is efficient implies the corollary that
it ought to be done, other things being equal, within legal culture to say
that there is a pattern in legal doctrine is to say that the pattern ought to
be followed. Thus, it is misleading to call the "positive economic theory of law" purely positive for the same reason it is misleading to call
efficiency discourse in economics purely positive. Statements about legal precedent entail positive statements about legal facts and cases, just
as statements about efficiency entail statements about cos~s. benefits,
prices, and quantities, but they are not equivalent to them. The primary
point of the positive economic theory of the common law was never
just to count a collection of cases for the sake of the count, but to elevate efficiency to the status of a principle. Indeed, in a series of writings in the 1980s, Posner offered an explicit defense of this principle,
arguing that justice consisted of nothing more than efficiency.65
We know from hindsight that while law and economics gained a
great deal of influence, it did not pan out as a new consensus theory.
The prestige of the economics discipline fell in the 1970s and 1980s as
economic growth leveled off and was replaced by stagflation in global
and national economies both. Posner's writings failed to persuade the
legal profession that efficiency and justice were the same thing, and the
efficiency criterion found itself subject to the same kinds of attacks that
more traditional candidates for neutral principles had suffered earlier.
The tension among efficiency, equity, and other aspects of justice remains as controversial as ever in public discourse.
That law and economics did not succeed at this level, though, was
inevitable. Modern neoclassical welfare economics never was suited to
the task of constructing a normative order for law. In fact, it does not
even play that role in economic culture, where the majority of economists are content to leave larger moral questions outside the discipline.
64. Posner, incidentally, has conceded this point. See POSNER, supra note 50, at
373-74.
65. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 48-87 (1981); Posner,
supra note 6.
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A normative concept rooted in positivism and not even regarded as decisive in its home field hardly could serve as an organizing concept for
a separate discipline that traditionally has treated normative analysis as
a central part of its task.
IV. LAW AND ECONOMICS

SEPARATED

To summarize the argument thus far: With the transformation of
political economy into modem neoclassical economics, economists
reached consensus within their own culture. They did so in part by
redrawing the discipline's boundaries so that the most controversial political issues - redistribution and objective conceptions of utility were defined to be outside the scope of professional discourse. Law _and
economics in the larger sense of a jurisprudential movement failed to
pan out because lawyers were and remain unwilling to redraw their professional boundaries in the same way. What, then, can economics offer
to lawyers who choose not to accept the account of professionalism that
dominates economic culture?
The key to making the exchange between law and economics a
useful one is the same as with any other cultural or interdisciplinary exchange. One must consider the foreign discipline's practices on its own
terms, and only then consider whether and how those terms and practices shed light on one's own. It will not do to borrow superficially the
practices of another discipline or culture, such as efficiency analysis or
formal modeling, without understanding the larger terms in which those
practices are understood. (Think, in comparison, of the way in which
some New Age, pop-spiritual philosophies borrow superficially from
Native American and Asian cultures.) But this will require, in its way,
becoming multicultural, as does all true interdisciplinary exchange. It
requires insiders to think about what it is like to be an outsider; it requires natives to act occasionally like anthropologists.
I have argued above that while positivism is problematic as an
epistemology, there are good and sensible pragmatic reasons for economists to proceed in their professional conversations as if it were valid.
First, it helps distinguish professional arguments from extraprofessional
arguments. Second, it helps distinguish arguments over means from arguments over ends. Third, it helps promote the development of expertise in the pursuance of ends. These are valid pragmatic reasons in all
professions and disciplines, and they can be valid for lawyers too, at
times. But what are those times?
Some lawyers will be willing entirely to adopt a view of professionalism that resembles that of economics, at least some of the time.
Call this view "instrumentalism," or "law as policy analysis." Under
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it, lawyers would use economics, along with other tools such as psychology, political science, and organizational theory, to choose the set
of institutions that best promote and mediate among the goals of independent and free individuals. A prominent example of this view can be
found in Gilson's proposal that lawyers should regard themselves as
"transaction cost engineers. " 66
The instrumentalist model appeals to an important and longstanding aspect of lawyers' professional tradition: the role of adviser to
a client. In this familiar role, lawyers are accustomed entirely to ceding
normative judgment, setting out alternatives, and letting the client
choose among them depending upon her goals and needs. Similarly,
most lawyers will be familiar with the task of taking the client's goals
as given and trying to design arrangements that will serve them best.
Such a professional role can have substantial ethical content, centered
around the norms of loyalty, trust, and fiduciary obligation. 67 It also
very much resembles economists' professionai commitment to efficiency as a norm. As a professional, one can take preferences as given
but still exercise judgment in figuring out the cheapest way to promote
them. This, I think, is why the economic approach may be easier to apply and more appealing in private law settings, where lawyers identify
more with clients, than in public law settings, where lawyers identify
more with the public interest.
Notwithstanding its roots in the profession's traditions, however,
many lawyers will find this view of professional responsibility neither a
sufficient account of their culture nor an appealing aspirational model.
Among these are critical theorists from CLS and elsewhere, communitarians of all political allegiances, and elite traditionalists such as
Kronman and Edwards who regard the law as a special calling. Even
within the attorney-client relationship, after all, lawyers have a long tradition of counseling clients on ends as well as means. Lawyers who too
narrowly serve their clients' ends are commonly censured in the popular
mind as "hired guns." Holmes's skeptical account of the "bad man"
plays off this popular sentiment, for he depicts this bad man as a fit client for the positivist lawyer.68
66. See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and
Asset Pricing, 94 YALE LJ. 239 (1984).
67. See, e.g., Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the
Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE LJ. 1060 (1976) (arguing that lawyers serve as special-purpose friends protecting individual autonomy within the adversarial system of the
law).
68. See Holmes, supra note 43, at 459 ("If you want to know the law and nothing
else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences
which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons
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Law as policy analysis, moreover, slights two other important aspects of lawyers' professional tradition: rhetorical advocacy and participation in public deliberations over public values. These aspects of professional role are especially cherished in the academy; indeed, even
economically influenced legal scholars remain primarily oriented toward public law reform scholarship notwithstanding their presumptive
belief in the efficacy of private ordering.69 From the viewpoints of these
competing professional values, economic analysis is at best a corrupting
distraction. It declares itself indifferent toward the content of ends. It
glorifies self-interested behavior rather than stigmatizing it. With its focus on efficiency, it takes the existing distribution of wealth and income
as given and thus implicitly endorses this distribution by not criticizing
it.
For economists, not saying anything about ultimate ends, selfinterest, or distribution is a professional virtue because it means that
their analyses and theories are general ones; tliel.r conclusions do not
depend on the particular content of the ends being analyzed, or on political controversies. From the viewpoint of law, however, this undermines
much of what lawyers traditionally have seen as central to their own
professional culture. Economists take preferences as given, but notwithstanding Holmes's bad man, many lawyers feel they cannot. A main
function of law is to alter preferences. Laws are not just constraints but,
when viewed from an insider's perspective, also norms that command
one's loyalty.
Accordingly, lawyers who hold these other traditions dear will not
want the rhetoric and culture of economics to take over the rhetoric and
culture of law. This explains, for instance, why Posner and Landes 's
discussion of adoption as a market70 has gained such notoriety in the
debate over the economic analysis of law even though most economists
would regard it as a peripheral and inessential application of economic
method. The idea of extending the market into the family evokes fears
of alienation and commodification, of undermining nonmarket values.
Those who oppose the intellectual exercise of doing so worry that the
positivist aspects of market culture will promote ethical relativism.
For all these reasons, the pragmatic justifications for positivism
within the economics profession may not always carry over to legal culfor conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of
conscience.").
69. I discuss this irony in Avery Katz, Taking Private Ordering Seriously, 144 U.
PA. L. REv. 1745 (1996).
70. See Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby
Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978).
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ture. Within their own culture, economists safely can restrict their attention to means - ~at is, to efficiency - knowing that some other actor
or institution will see to the content of ends. Lawyers may not feel they
can abdicate responsibility for these other goals, and citizens and public
officials surely cannot adopt such an approach.
For lawyers who object on ethical grounds to instrumentalism,
then, what use can one make of positive economics? Some will want to
reject it entirely, on the ground that focusing on positive concerns will
mean that normative ones will be sacrificed. Such a position could be
taken coherently on grounds of opportunity cost alone: taking ends as
given forfeits the opportunity to deliberate over them and criticize them.
Alternatively, if one views positive and normative discourse as inherently linked at an epistemological level, trying to engage in positive discourse in isolation simply will confuse and cloud the normative issues
and make it harder to engage in normative discourse at all. This is an
objection that should be familiar to American lawyers, as it was a chief
plank in the Legal Realists' critique of traditional formalism.
Finally, there is a risk that if one spends too much time calculating
how best to pursue others' ends, one will come to adopt them, losing
one's own in the process. This is surely a real possibility; as a matter of
social interaction, lawyers commonly come to identify with the interests
of clients, just as many economists who study business organizations
come to identify with the interests of their subjects. Our own students
recognize this phenomenon when they lament the supposed "corporate
track" in legal education.
One can, as Hannah Arendt did in her celebrated essay Eichmann
in Jerusalem, find apocalyptic illustrations here as well. 71 Arendt's aphorism, the "banality of evil," can be interpreted as a comment on positivism; its import is that it is far too easy for moral choices to get lost
in the ordinary pursuit of instrumental goals. Still, one cannot live as if
every moment were the apocalypse. A professional culture will break
down if it cannot identify some issues as its own and leave others to the
culture at large. We may no longer be able to regard law as autonomous
in the way lawyers perceived it to· be before Legal Realism, but that
does not mean it must be reduced to politics, morality, or economics.
In this regard, it is helpful to return to the debate over legal positivism, and to Hart's defense of it. To the extent that Hart's jurisprudence is coherent, lawyers can, with proper technical skills, recognize
settled legal questions, usefully distinguish them from unsettled bound71. See HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF

EVIL (rev. ed. Vlking Press 1964) (1963).
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ary disputes, advise clients, and recommend reforms to legislators and
government admipistrators. Hart argued that while there always would
be close cases on the periphery of the law to be resolved in discretionary fashion, rules could and would govern in the core. This account of
legal rules was disputed by Fuller and later by Dworkin, who argued
that first, even within core cases, there is room for moral argument, and
that second, at the margins, there is never mere discretion, but instead
an obligation to decide in good faith on the best interpretation of all the
legal, moral, and cultural materials that are available.72
If one talces this latter view literally, however, then the values of
legal culture are implicated in all cases and are, at least potentially, up
for grabs all the time. Indeed, this is essentially the position of critical
legal studies and of legal postmodernism - that indeterminacy is everywhere, every case is close, and everything is up for grabs all the time.
But if all values and perceptions are up for grabs all the time, and not
just in the occasional hard case, then there is no. opportunity for normal
life, or for ordinary work to get done. Indeed, this is one of the most
telling objections to economic culture; the way it also puts things up for
grabs all the time, by posing choices all the time and expecting us to
maximize. We might reasonably prefer in many instances to avoid the
fact that we are making choices; and to satisfice.
One can draw an analogy here to Thomas Kuhn's account of theoretical revolutions in the natural sciences.73 Most of the time, scientific
culture talces fundamental issues for granted and does "normal science." Only occasionally do revolutionary moments come along to
punctuate ordinary practice. Not every moment, however, can be revolutionary; there needs to be something to revolt against. This means
making time for normal work - time for taking ends as given and focusing on means. Such times are when positivism will be useful both in law and in economics. If we are lucky enough to be able to live
a normal life most of the time, then positivism will be useful most of
the time.
Economic positivism, therefore, can be pragmatically useful to
lawyers for pretty much the same reasons that legal positivism can be
pragmatically useful, and anyone who appreciates the pragmatic point
of legal positivism should be able to appreciate why economists talk
and analyze the way they do. Lawyers who regard legal positivism as
unhelpful are unlikely to have much use for law and economics, con72. See, e.g., Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 14
(1967); Ronald M. Dworkin, Social Rules and Legal Theory, 81 YALE LJ. 855 (1972).
73. See THOMAS s. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLlTTIONS (2 Intl.
Encyclopedia of Unified Sci., No. 2, 2d ed. 1970).
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versely, but at least they and the economists who argue with them
should be able to. understand why this is the case.
All this suggests various ways in which economic analysis could
be applied usefully to law, notwithstanding the differences in the two
disciplines's methodological attitudes. One way would be for law and
economics to be done in economics departments, by economists, as part
of the standard applied microeconomic research program. Indeed this is
now being done and is probably the major area of growth for law and
economics in the last ten years. The economists doing this work can
present their conclusions in the form of trade-offs and defer to lawyers'
and the public's normative judgments regarding the ultimate trade-offs
to be made - just as they traditionally have done in other areas of public policy.
Second, lawyers could in appropriate circumstances adopt a view
of professionalism closer to that of economists. This would mean confining themselves to presenting the advantages and disadvantages of
available choices as honestly as possible and then deferring to other
decisionmakers. In private contexts this would be entirely consistent
with lawyers' traditional obligations to their clients. In public contexts,
though, it would require lawyers to place less emphasis on their roles as
advocates and participating decisionmakers, and to view the government - or the public - as their client. This view would, if taken seriously, require the sorts of tasks that private lawyers undertake in regard
to their clients; in particular, it would mean consulting the public and
paying attention to its actual views. Such an approach might be novel,
but it could help bridge the increasingly lamented gap between the legal
academy, which has in recent years focused on advocacy and deliberation as its primary values, and the practicing bar, which has remained
much more attached to the model of client service.
Third, to the extent that legal professional identity requires normative advocacy and choice, lawyers need not and should not abandon
honest attempts at description. While the task of description does presuppose a perspective, that perspective need not be permanently fixed.
Positive analysis, whether of law, economics, or the natural world, will
reveal information about a variety of perspectives other than one's own
and thus provide material for new and perhaps deeper interpretations. It
may indicate ways in which one's normative commitments may be pursued more fruitfully. It may even reveal that the conflicts among one's
normative views and those held by others are less fundamental than is
initially apparent. But such possibilities can never be revealed if one
refuses' to look. Perhaps those skeptical of positivism might consider the
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possibility of what John Rawls has called a "reflective equilibrium. " 74
One starts, necessarily, with a nonnative perspective. One sees what
one can see from that perspective, and such observations may create
dissonance, but dissonance is not to be feared; it may feed back, changing one's perspective, allowing new insights to be perceived, which
themselves feed back. Eventually, one may come to reach a state where
perspective and observations are in harmony - or at least, one may
come to live with the dissonance.
How could this be operationalized in practice? Lawyers committed
to normative reform - or to revolution, for that matter - could view
themselves as playing the part of both lawyer and client, of agent and
principal. In the role of agent, they could use economics, or whatever
other social science tools they wished, to identify the choices available
to them. Then, in the role of principal, they could make the choice according to whatever values they cared ultimately to espouse.
Opponents of positivism will raise an objection to this suggestion:
the act of playing any instrumental role, whether as economist, policy
analyst, or consulting lawyer, could spill over and influence one's own
goals and preferences in the role of client. One legitimately might not
want to become the sort of person who studies scarcity might incentives
all the time, or to take on the values that arise from such a life plan.
But that is not what is really at stake; what is at stake is whether one
will become the kind of person who studies scarcity, incentives, and
other economic issues some of the time - whether one allows oneself
the perspective of agent as well as principal. Taking both perspectives
might still have an effect on one's goals, but this limited effect might
well be a good thing. It is not clear, after all, why one should give dispositive weight to normative values that cannot survive scrutiny of the
methods necessary to achieve them in practice. Separating positive from
normative analysis at least provides such scrutiny.
CONCLUSIONS

The difference between law and economics is in large part a cultural clash. The two professions are trying to do different things, and
they have different professional identities and aspirations and different
ways of talking. One of the most important of these cultural differences
has to do with the relative importance the two disciplines attach to normative discourse. Economists are unified in their commitment to positivism and to the idea that one can proceed usefully while putting nor74. See JOHN RAWLS, A
the concept).
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mative issues to one side, and lawyers are not. Economists'
commitment to positivism, however, is not really justified on the
grounds they sometimes assert - as a matter of correct epistemology
or philosophy of science. Economic positivism is justified instead on
pragmatic grounds, as a way of defining and promoting professional
discourse within the discipline.
To bridge the cultural and methodological gap between law and economics on this issue, two things need to happen. First, economists
need to recognize that their reasons for being positivists are pragmatic
rather than metaphysical or epistemological, and they must examine and
explicitly defend their methodology. They should not make the mistake
of assuming that what are good pragmatic reasons for them are necessarily good pragmatic reasons for lawyers. Richard Posner has taken this
tack in some of his more recent writings, in which he justifies the use
of economics, among other analytical methods, in explicitly pragmatic
tenns.75 Second, lawyers need to understand that there are some sensible reasons for economists to be positivists, and that some, if not all, of
those reasons could be sensible reasons for them as well. Whether one
accepts positivism or not, however, critics of law and economics should
at least recognize that many of the familiar arguments in favor of legal
positivism can help explain why economists think it reasonable to talk
as they do.
fumy view, lawyers have as much reason to be positivists as economists do, because .lawyers have much professional work to do that is
usefully distinguishable from general moral argument. Being a positivist, or a proponent of using economics in law, does not have to mean
that one abjures moral choice. Rather, it can mean that one better recognizes moral choice for what it is. This, in the end, was Hart's ultimate
justification for being a legal positivist:
Surely if we have learned anything from the history of morals it is that
the thing to do with a moral quandary is not to hide it. Like nettles, the
occasions when life forces us to choose between the lesser of two evils
must be grasped with the consciousness that they are what they are. The
vice of this use of the principle that, at certain limiting points, what is utterly immoral cannot be law or lawful is that it will serve to cloak the
true nature of the problems with which we are faced and will encourage
the romantic optimism that all the values we cherish ultimately will fit
into a single system, that no one of them has to be sacrificed or compromised to accommodate another. . . . This is surely untrue and there is an
insincerity in any formulation of our problem which allows us to de-

75. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 50; Posner, supra note 53.
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scribe the treatment of the dilemma as if it were the disposition of the ordinary case.76

In ethics as well as in economics, the choices are often dismal, and
there is rarely such a thing as a free lunch. It is still possible, however,
to apprise oneself of the alternatives, and to choose wisely and well.

76. Hart, supra note 11, at 619-20.

